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P.: Abstracts of Recent Cases
CASE COMMENTS
Walk, 3 Ill. 2d 313, 121 N.E.2d 483 (1954); Mangnum v. Wilson,
235 N.C. 353, 70 S.E.2d 19 (1952); Stophlet v. Stophlet, 22 Ohio
App. 327, 153 N.E. 867 (1926). In the principal case this rule was
held inapplicable since the court had found that the testator did not
intend to create a fee simple, but only intended to create a life
estate; therefore, there was no fee simple to be reduced by a subsequent clause. This rule amounts to nothing more than a presumption in favor of the absolute estate, and can be rendered inflective
by the application of another rule of construction holding that the
latter of two conflicting provisions prevails. 1 Simms A
SMITH,
THm LAw OF FuTuRl INrTS's 460 (1956).
It is submitted that the view of the principal case is the better
one, since the other views can operate to defeat the intention of the
testator. This decision is a clear indication that West Virginia follows the modem view that the testators intention as gathered from
the whole will is the paramount consideration, and that intention
so found cannot be defeated by the application of rules of law
which conflict with it.
J. O. F.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
CtmmNL LAw-INcEsT-No INTENT REQumEVEMNT.-P was convicted of the crime of incest and was sentenced to a term of five
to ten years imprisonment. He later sought a writ of habeas corpus
ad subfiiendum on the ground that the indictment under which
he was convicted was void in that it failed to state that he committed the act wilfully or with intent. Held, that incest is a statutory crime and that no particular mental state or condition is specified by the statute as a necessary element of the offense; therefore
such a state or condition need not be alleged in the indictment.
Writ denied. United States ex rel. Preece v. Coiner, 150 F. Supp.
511 (N.D. W. Va. 1957).

The first case in West Virginia to cast a spell of doubt upon
the wholesomeness of the doctrine of absolute criminal liability
was one involving the very question before the court in the principal case. State v. Pennington, 41 W. Va. 599, 23 S.E. 918 (1896).
There Judge Brannon, referring to a Vermont case which stated
that ignorance was no defense to an indictment for incest, wrote:
"I must be allowed to doubt so much of that opinion as holds that
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knowledge of relationship by the accused is not necessary." Al.
though the court reached the same conclusion there as in the principal case, it is noteworthy that even this small doubt, as to whether
justice is rendered by our statute, is no longer present in today's
decisions. Query: Have the controversies surrounding the doctrine
of absolute criminal liability been relegated to academic discus.
sions alone? If they have, perhaps, in the interest of justice, they
should once more be brought forth by the courts. For a full discussion on this subject, see Mueller, Mens Rea and the Law Without It, 58 W. VA. L. BEv. 84 (1955).
T. E. P.
CRImINAL LAw-PM

rrATm MuRDE-DEFENSE oF MErAL

INcAPAcrr.-D was convicted of murder in the first degree for the

fatal shooting of his wife during a violent quarrel. When he attempted to present psychiatric evidence that his mental age was
ten years and eleven months in order to establish that he was not
mentally capable of premeditation, the evidence was refused.
Held, that the trial court was not in error in refusing to let the
evidence go to the jury. Judgment affirmed. State v. Flint,96 S.E.2d
677 (W. Va. 1957).
The court stated that the principal case presented no substantial basis for departing from the so called "right and wrong" test.
This is the first case handed down by our court on this subject
since Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (1954), which threw
out the old M'Naughten rule as a test for insanity and adopted a
rule similar to that in New Hampshire, the test being that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect. Although the modem
trend is followed only by a small minority of the courts, perhaps
the West Virginia court would be more willing to review the new
test if faced by a case more directly in point than the principal
case. For further cases and discussion, see Annot., 70 A.L.R. 659
(1929), 173 A.L.R. 391 (1947), 45 A.L.R.2d 1430 (1954), 14 AM.
JuRa., Criminal Law §§ 35, 36 (1938).
T. E. P.
CONsrrrtmoNAL LAw-PocEDuRAL DUE PRocEss-ImiEGuLrr
iN PREPARATION OF TmAR4. TRANsCa-rJ.-P was convicted of a series

of felonies and was sentenced to death upon two counts charging
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him with kidnaping for the purpose of robbery and with infliction
of bodily harm. Under the California Penal Code, he was given an
automatic appeal. After the trial the regular court reporter died
and a substitute reporter was appointed. The latter reporter was an
uncle by marriage of the deputy district attorney who was in charge
of P's prosecution. This reporter worked in close collaboration with
the prosecutor in preparing the trial transcript He also reviewed
with police officers, who testified for the state, his transcription of
their testimony. During the state court proceedings for settlement
of the trial transcript, which constituted the appellate record, P was
not represented in person or by court-appointed counsel. His conviction was later affirmed by the appellate court.
P applied for a writ of habeas corpus, but the district court
denied the application, and the court of appeals affirmed the lower
court's decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held,
that "consistent with procedural due process, California's affirmance
of petitioner's conviction upon a seriously disputed record, whose
accuracy petitioner has had no voice in determining, cannot be
allowed to stand." Judgments of the lower courts were reversed
and the case was remanded with instructions. Cheesman v. Teets,
77 Sup. Ct. 1127 (1957).
This case, along with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956),
reflects a modem development in law, e.g., a growing interest by
the court in fairness in appellate procedures. The Griffin case,
which has been followed by our court in Linger v. Jennings, 99
S.E.2d 740 (W. Va. 1957), held that the denial of full appellate
review solely on the basis of the defendant's inability to pay for a
necessary transcript was a violation of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. For further comment on the latter case, see Comment, 59 W. VA. L. Rlv. 79 (1956).
T. E. P.
CoNsrrrtroNAx LAw-FAIm TADEs Acr-NoNsicNi P1ovsioN
NOT ExpxxssSED iN Tr=z OF Acr Is UNcoNsrrtrrONJ.--P instituted

an action for an injunction to prevent retail sales by D of P's trademarked products at less than the resale prices fixed by P in contracts
with other retailers. P based his right of action on West Virginia's
Fair Trade Act, W. VA. CoD)E c. 47, art. 11 § 6 (Michie 1955),
which states that "wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for
sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in
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any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of this act,
whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or
is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby." D was not a party
to any contract with P establishing fair trade prices for P's product,
and he contended that § 6 of the act, insofar as it was applicable
to a person not a party to such a contract, was unconstitutional.
He based his contention on the ground that the act, as passed by
the state legislature, W. Va. Acts 1937, c. 123, § 6, did not meet
the requirements of W. VA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 30, which provides
that if any object is embraced in an act which is not expressed in
the title, the act shall be void as to so much thereof. Held, that the
nonsigner provision violated the state constitution. Injunction
denied. General Electric Co. v. Wender, 151 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.
W. Va. 1957).
This case is of interest inasmuch as it gives free reign to retail
dealers vho are not parties to fair trade contracts. As a result West
Virginia's doors are now open to discount houses and other business
establishments of a similar nature. Of course the legislature can
still re-enact the statute with the nonsigner provision included in
its title, and thus make the section constitutional. Annot., 103
A.L.R. 1331 (1936), 125 A.L.R. 1835 (1939).
T. E. P.
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